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MEDICAID’S NEXT FIFTY YEARS: 
ALIGNING AN OLD PROGRAM WITH THE NEW NORMAL 
SARA ROSENBAUM* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The largest of all means-tested entitlement programs and a long-term 
survivor of battles over spending and ideology, Medicaid was significantly 
transformed by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).1 But 
further reforms are needed if Medicaid is to emerge as what Chief Justice 
John Roberts in NFIB v. Sebelius characterized as “an element of a 
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance 
coverage.”2 Medicaid figured prominently in the Court’s decision; the 
ruling, which barred the Secretary from fully enforcing the terms of the 
mandatory expansion,3 can be expected to have a significant impact on the 
rate and scope of state implementation of the Medicaid reforms. Even so, 
most observers expect states ultimately to implement the expansion, 
reasoning that the enormous need for insurance coverage for the poor, 
coupled with the Act’s financial advantages, will lead states to move 
forward.4 As they do, one would expect that the wheels of legislative 
 
* J.D., Harold and Jane Hirsh Professor, Health Law and Policy, George Washington 
University School of Public Health and Health Services. I am extremely grateful to my research 
assistant, Michal McDowell, for her research help. 
 1. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 36B(b)(3)(A)(i), (b)(2) (2011); Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 2001, 1413, 124 Stat. 119, 233, 271 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 18083, 1396a(e) (2011)) [hereinafter ACA]. 
 2. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012) [hereinafter 
NFIB]. 
 3. For a comprehensive discussion of the ruling, see Nicole Huberfield et al., Plunging 
Into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in the Healthcare Cases (B.U. Sch. of Law, 
Working Paper No. 12-40, 2012), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/ 
workingpapers/2012.html; see also Samuel Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the 
Spending Clause After NFIB (Geo. L.J. Research Paper No. 286, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128977. 
 4. By mid-February 2013, officials in 18 states had indicated that they were definitely not 
participating or leaning in that direction. The remaining states were either in the process of 
adoption, leaning toward adoption, or undecided. Where States Stand on the Medicaid 
Expansion, THE ADVISORY BOARD (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.advisory.com/Daily-Brief 
ing/2012/11/09/MedicaidMap#lightbox/1/. Indeed, several Republican governors who 
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innovation would continue to turn, as they have for decades, in order to 
produce the next generation of legislative amendments essential to 
retrofitting an established program to a new order. But the question that 
now confronts Medicaid is whether the reform process will be business as 
usual or whether a poisonous political environment will impede this effort to 
assure that Medicaid indeed is able to more successfully play an expanded 
role in the American health system. 
Continuing the work of re-designing Medicaid is essential for two 
reasons. First, the success of the ACA’s insurance reforms hinges on the new 
system’s ability to enroll millions of previously uninsured young, healthy 
working-age adults and their families. Today this population is strikingly 
poor: more than one-third of all Americans live in families with incomes 
below twice the federal poverty level,5 and it is this group that lacks health 
insurance coverage.6 Thus, a large proportion of the newly insured will 
require subsidies if coverage is to be affordable. Because Congress chose to 
design a subsidy coverage system that spans two distinct markets (Medicaid 
and state health insurance Exchanges),7 assuring their harmonious 
functioning becomes central to the success of health reform. This aim 
assumes special importance for younger, healthier people, whose tolerance 
for frequent coverage lapses and loss of access to network physicians may 
be minimal. 
Second, additional reforms are needed in order to align Medicaid’s new 
mission to insure virtually all poor U.S. residents8 with other program 
 
initially had strongly opposed the Medicaid expansion were moving toward its embrace. Paul 
West, Medicaid Expansion Divides GOP Governors, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2013), http://articles. 
latimes.com/2013/feb/07/nation/la-na-medicaid-20130208/2. 
 5. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 18 tbl.5 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf. 
 6. In 2011, more than three-quarters of uninsured Americans had family incomes below 
250% of the federal poverty level. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE UNINSURED AND THE DIFFERENCE 
HEALTH INSURANCE MAKES 2 fig.3 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/14 
20-14.pdf. 
 7. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH REFORM: ELIGIBILITY AND ENROLLMENT 
PROCESSES FOR MEDICAID, CHIP, AND SUBSIDIES IN THE EXCHANGES 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8090.pdf. 
 8. Medicaid excludes coverage of otherwise eligible persons not lawfully present in the 
United States. Medicaid eligibility for non-citizens is linked to their immigration status, and the 
law imposes a five-year waiting period on eligibility for legal U.S. residents. See ALLISON 
SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TREATMENT OF NONCITIZENS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION 
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 7 (2011), available at http://www.nafsa.org/uploadedFiles/CRS% 
20analysis%20re%20noncitizens.pdf. Legal residents are covered by the Act’s minimum 
coverage requirements and entitled to use state Exchanges. They may obtain subsidized 
coverage through health insurance Exchanges as well as tax subsidies during their five-year 
waiting period for Medicaid coverage. Persons not lawfully present in the U.S. are excluded 
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responsibilities. The first responsibility is to finance healthcare for millions of 
children and adults with disabilities, for whom conventional health insurance 
(even if they have it) is not sufficient. The ACA bars pre-existing condition 
exclusions9 and annual and lifetime dollar limits on most covered care;10 the 
law also imposes annual limits on families’ out-of-pocket cost exposure.11 
But these reforms offer inadequate protection for conditions that require 
treatments that lie beyond the outer limits of the commercial insurance 
coverage design that is the ACA’s hallmark in the new insurance market. 
Historically, Medicaid has played the dominant role in long-term care, not 
only as a primary insurer, but also as a supplemental insurer for individuals 
with primary coverage through Medicare or employer-sponsored plans.12 
Aligning Medicaid’s historic role in financing care for people with disabilities 
represents a major challenge left shockingly unaddressed by the ACA, with 
potentially dangerous results. 
The second responsibility is support for the healthcare safety net; indeed, 
Medicaid has long served as the economic base on which the safety net 
rests.13 The safety net is complex, comprised of healthcare institutions with a 
 
from the minimum coverage requirement, I.R.C. § 5000A(d)(3) (2011), and also are excluded 
from purchasing health insurance coverage through state Exchanges. ACA § 1312(f)(3) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18032 (2011)). Of the nation’s 21.6 million non-citizens, 
approximately 11.2 million are estimated to be not lawfully present. SISKIN, supra, at 2-3. 
Compared to the general population, undocumented persons are far more likely to be 
uninsured (47% compared to 15%). KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY: FIVE BASIC FACTS ON 
IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR HEALTH CARE (2008), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/ 
7761.pdf. 
 9. ACA § 1201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 (2011)). 
 10. ACA § 1001 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (2011)). The bar on annual and 
lifetime dollar limits applies only to benefits and services falling within the Act’s essential health 
benefit categories. Id. § 1302 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2011)). 
 11. ACA § 1201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2011)). 
 12. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID FACTS, MEDICAID AND LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES AND 
SUPPORTS 1 (2009), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/2186_06.pdf; KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE CHARTBOOK, SECTION SIX: SUPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE COVERAGE 58 
(4th ed. 2010). 
 13. Medicaid accounts for 35% of public hospitals’ net revenue and 37% of health center 
funding. See NAT’L ASS’N OF PUBLIC HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS, IN UNCERTAIN TIMES, 
SAFETY NET HOSPITALS MAINTAIN COMMITMENT TO SERVE 2 fig.2 (2012), available at 
http://www.naph.org/Main-Menu-Category/Publications/Safety-Net-Financing/FY2010- Char 
acteristics-Report-Summary.aspx?FT=.pdf; see generally PETER SHIN ET AL., KAISER FAMILIY 
FOUND., HEALTH CENTERS: AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THEIR EXPERIENCES WITH PRIVATE 
HEALTH INSURANCE (2008), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7738.pdf; SHIN 
ET AL., GEO. WASH. U. SCH. PUB. HEALTH & HEALTH SERVS., AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS 
OF MEDICAID DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS ON HEALTH CENTERS AND THEIR PATIENTS 6 
(2007), available at http://sphhs.gwu.edu/departments/healthpolicy/CHPR/downloads/Medi 
caid_Doc_Requirements.pdf. 
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tradition of serving poor and vulnerable patients, as well as entities such as 
public hospitals and federally funded community health centers14 that by law 
must furnish care to all residents of their service areas15 and that are 
protected under Medicaid through special payment rules.16 
The safety net’s role will likely only intensify in the wake of reform.17 Even 
at full implementation, 27 million people will remain uninsured,18 and the 
remaining uninsured can be expected increasingly to shift into safety net 
settings.19 Furthermore, persons newly insured under Medicaid will be more 
likely to reside in medically underserved communities characterized by 
elevated poverty and health risks and reduced access to care, because of 
the strong association between low income and lack of health insurance.20 
Additionally, millions of lower income safety net patients who gain coverage 
will nonetheless continue to face significant cost-sharing obligations both for 
covered benefits (subsidized health insurance plans sold through Exchanges 
will have only a 70% actuarial value,21 and cost sharing reduction 
assistance is available but by no means complete) and for uncovered costs 
such as adult dental care. The safety net can be expected to absorb the 
immediate surge in healthcare use following full implementation. 
 
 14. For a general discussion of community health centers and the Affordable Care Act, 
see Eli Adashi et al., Health Care Reform and Primary Care – The Growing Importance of the 
Community Health Center, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2047 (2010). 
 15. For a general discussion of the healthcare safety net, see INST. OF MED., THE HEALTH 
CARE SAFETY NET: INTACT BUT ENDANGERED (2000). For a discussion of how the ACA affects 
safety net institutions and providers, see Mark Hall & Sara Rosenbaum, The Health Care Safety 
Net in the Context of National Health Insurance Reform, in THE HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET IN A 
POST-REFORM WORLD (Mark Hall & Sara Rosenbaum eds., 2012) [hereinafter SAFETY NET]. 
 16. Rosenbaum, Reinventing a Classic: Community Health Centers and the Newly 
Insured, in SAFETY NET, supra note 15, at 76-77. 
 17. Id. at 76. 
 18. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE AND JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE 
INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 12 tbl.3 (2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-13-Coverage%20Esti 
mates.pdf. 
 19. This is precisely what happened in Massachusetts in the wake of that state’s health 
reform effort; following passage, health centers served an even higher proportion of the state’s 
remaining uninsured population. Leighton Ku et al., Safety Net Providers After Health Reform: 
Lessons from Massachusetts, 171 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1379, 1382-83 (2011). 
 20. ROSENBAUM ET AL., GEO. WASH. U. SCH. PUB. HEALTH & HEALTH SERVS., NATIONAL 
HEALTH REFORM: HOW WILL MEDICALLY UNDERSERVED COMMUNITIES FARE? 10-11 (2009), 
available at http://sphhs.gwu.edu/departments/healthpolicy/dhp_publications/pub_uploads/ 
dhpPublication_5046C2DE-5056-9D20-3D2A570F2CF3F8B0.pdf. 
 21. The silver plan, the standard health plan linked to premium tax credits in health 
insurance Exchanges, is pegged to 70% of the full actuarial value of benefit. ACA § 
1302(d)(1)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2011)); id. § 1401 (codified at I.R.C. § 36 
(2011)). 
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A third responsibility is improving health care for the poor. Continuity is 
a holy grail of healthcare quality improvement, one on which deeper health 
system improvements largely depend. Now that Congress has chosen to 
create two separate markets for subsidized coverage, the task becomes 
market alignment in ways that enable more stable coverage, foster longer 
term relationships between patients and providers, and reduce the potential 
for gaming in a system that, driven by market forces, may be incentivized to 
skimp on care, secure in the knowledge that in a matter of months, patients 
will disappear. Medicaid offers rich and extensive coverage. It is unique in 
that respect and has proved capable of achieving important health and 
healthcare outcomes for the poor.22 Now the goal is its greater integration 
in to a broader, subsidized market for health care. 
The article examines Medicaid in the wake of the ACA and prospects for 
further reform given the political environment that now envelopes it. 
II.  THE ACA AND MEDICAID’S FIVE ALIGNMENT CHALLENGES 
A. Context 
Uninsured people are the chief immediate beneficiaries of the sweeping 
reforms made by the ACA. But being uninsured is not a static event, and 
even before passage of the Act, churning in and out of coverage was a well-
documented problem,23 with over 40% of Medicaid-insured adults losing 
coverage within a year.24 The problem of coverage churn will persist in the 
wake of the ACA; its potential magnitude was captured in a 2011 study25 
that simulated the coverage experience of adults with incomes below twice 
the federal poverty level at the point of full implementation of the Affordable 
Care Act. The study found that within 6 months, over 35% of American 
adults with incomes below twice the federal poverty level can be expected to 
experience a change in income that will shift them from Medicaid (where 
eligibility ends at 133% of the federal poverty level) to coverage through a 
 
 22. Many studies have shown Medicaid’s impact on the health of the poor. See, e.g., 
KAREN DAVIS & CATHY SCHOEN, HEALTH AND THE WAR ON POVERTY: A TEN-YEAR APPRAISAL (The 
Brookings Inst. ed., 1978) (discussing the reduction in infant mortality and benefits to the poor 
credited to Medicaid); Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Mortality and Access to Care Among 
Adults After State Medicaid Expansions, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED 1025 (2012) (showing that 
Medicaid has been shown to achieve important health outcomes for its beneficiaries). 
 23. See, e.g., Pam Farley Short & Deborah R. Graefe, Battery-Powered Health Insurance? 
Stability in Coverage of the Uninsured, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 244. 
 24. Benjamin D. Sommers, Loss of Health Insurance Among Non-elderly Adults in 
Medicaid, 24 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1, 2 (2009). 
 25. Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform: How Changes in 
Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth Between Medicaid and Insurance Exchanges, 30 
HEALTH AFF. 228, 232 (2011). 
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state health insurance Exchange, or the reverse. Within one year, 50% — 
28 million adults — will experience a shift in one direction or the other. 
Even more striking, 24% of this group will have experienced 2 or more 
changes in one year; over a two-year period, the number experiencing two 
or more changes rises to 39%. More than 40% of these adults are estimated 
to have children under age 19, meaning that the problem will affect both 
millions of children and adults. 
The adverse ramifications of churn are great, not only for the families 
that experience the effects of churn — interrupted coverage, plan switching 
between two markets, and breaks in the continuity of treatment from a 
regular provider — but also for the broader goal of affordability. The 
estimated 56 million low income adults and 35 million children who will 
experience post-reform churn across the Medicaid and Exchange markets26 
represent the healthiest risk groups across the two markets. Unlike the 
millions of older and sicker adults who gain enormous benefits from health 
reform, this group is in the workforce and in relatively good health. The 
cause of their cross-market churn is, of course, income fluctuation, which is 
more likely to occur in working families than in adults who are in poorer 
health and living on fixed incomes.27 For these families, income fluctuates as 
younger workers enter and leave the job market, add or drop hours of 
employment, or have children, thereby increasing family size in relation to 
total household income, which in turn triggers an effective decline in family 
income in relation to the federal poverty level. 
B. Specific Challenges 
Addressing the problem of constant churning across two distinct 
insurance markets requires multiple types of market alignment. Entry into the 
system needs to be conceptualized as a single point of entry, where people 
can be linked to the proper subsidy source both initially and as 
circumstances change. Enrollment must be stable so that re-evaluation of 
financial eligibility for subsidies need happen only periodically, in the 
manner of an annual enrollment period. Benefits and cost sharing need to 
be aligned so that members become accustomed to what is and is not 
covered. The same health plans using the same delivery networks should be 
sold in the two markets so that in the event that the source of subsidy needs 
to change as a result of fluctuation in real or effective income, plan 
membership and provider continuity will remain stable. Under this scenario, 
fluctuating income would entail a transactional shift in subsidy source, but 
no shift in coverage or care. 
 
 26. Id. at 232. 
 27. Id. at 229. 
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The question is whether the Medicaid reforms introduced under the Act 
are sufficient to get the system to this point, even assuming that states fully 
implement the Medicaid expansion in the wake of NFIB and that states 
implement choices that are consistent with this vision of market alignment. 
Unfortunately, the ACA Medicaid amendments fall short in a number of key 
respects, as do the provisions establishing state Exchanges. Furthermore, 
early implementation of the Act by the United States Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) suggests a willingness to tolerate state 
implementation choices that are at odds with market alignment. Finally, the 
Act entirely fails to recognize a crucial issue related to Medicaid’s 
longstanding role as a source of supplemental health insurance for children 
and adults with disabilities. 
1. Aligning Enrollment 
The ACA creates two distinct subsidized health insurance markets: 
Medicaid for the poorest people; and premium subsidies and cost sharing 
reduction assistance offered through state Exchanges for persons whose 
incomes fall below the upper limits for this type of affordability assistance,28 
but are too high to qualify for Medicaid.29 Eligibility for premium subsidies is 
linked to coverage months,30 and assistance is barred for any month that an 
individual is eligible for another form of “minimum essential coverage,”31 
which includes Medicaid.32 The extraordinary degree to which, in an effort 
to avert a “crowd-out” effect,33 Exchange premium subsidies must be 
exclusively focused on those without another form of coverage means that in 
a fluctuating income environment, enrollment and income evaluation 
functions between state Exchanges and Medicaid agencies must be 
exquisitely and continually aligned. To this end, the Act requires state 
Exchanges to screen all applicants for potential Medicaid eligibility and to 
“enroll such individuals in” Medicaid if their “modified adjusted gross 
 
 28. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i) (2011). The range is from 133% of the federal poverty level to 
400% of the federal poverty level. 
 29. Id. § 36. 
 30. Id. § 36B(b)(2). 
 31. Id. §§ 36B(b)(2), 36B(c)(2)(B), 5000A(f)(1)(C). 
 32. Id. § 5000A(f)(1)(A)(ii). 
 33. The extent to which concerns over government-supported health insurance “crowds 
out” private sector coverage has been a major, if misplaced, concern in U.S. health reform 
policy for decades. For an important critique, see Mark Schlesinger, Crowding Out: Multiple 
Manifestations, Muddled Meanings, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 851 (2012) (arguing that the 
concept has deterred government interventions aimed at correcting failures in the health 
insurance market). 
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income” (MAGI)34 places them within the Medicaid eligibility range.35 The 
Act further requires Medicaid agencies to undertake a series of steps aimed 
at simplifying the Medicaid enrollment and redetermination process itself36 
and to assure that individuals who apply for coverage through an Exchange 
and who are found eligible for Medicaid because their income is too low 
will be “enrolled” in Medicaid.37 
Total alignment of enrollment functions certainly does not cure the 
problem of having to effectively re-evaluate income on a monthly basis. But 
it certainly helps. However, an already significant problem was worsened by 
an implementation choice made by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS), which administers both the ACA’s Medicaid and Exchange 
provisions. Despite the ACA’s clarity on the issue of alignment through 
enrollment and re-enrollment, final CMS regulations permit Exchanges to 
stop at the point of eligibility determination and redetermination and simply 
transfer files to Medicaid agencies for final determinations and enrollment.38 
The abandonment of alignment through a unified enrollment process is the 
gift that will keep on giving, since, as the evidence shows, the process of 
losing and gaining income is a dynamic one that can take place multiple 
times throughout a given year. The absence of a single portal for 
enrollment, regardless of the source of premium subsidy, virtually ensures 
breaks in coverage, as the subsidy basis continually changes. This 
phenomenon is evident even in Massachusetts, where, years after reform, 
lower income adults continue to experience frequent breaks in coverage.39 
Two changes might ease this problem. The first is requiring states to 
fulfill their system integration responsibilities by a set date and barring 
separate enrollment procedures. In states utilizing federally administered 
Exchanges (and the fact that only 13 states and the District of Columbia had 
enacted Exchange laws as of May 2012 suggests that many will do so),40 
 
 34. The Act establishes a “modified adjusted gross income” methodology for evaluating 
income for purposes of both Medicaid and Exchange affordability assistance. ACA § 2002 
(amending 42 U.S.C. §1396a(e)(14) (2011)). 
 35. Id. § 1311(d)(4)(F) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2011)). 
 36. Id. § 1413 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18083 (2011)). 
 37. Id. § 1413(a). 
 38. 42 C.F.R. §§ 155.305(b), 155.310(d)(3) (2012). 
 39. John A. Graves and Katherine Schwartz, Health Care Reform and the Dynamics of 
Insurance Coverage – Lessons from Massachusetts, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1181, 1183 
(2012). 
 40. SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, STATE HEALTH INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE LAWS: THE FIRST GENERATION 1 (2012), available at http://www.commonwealth 
fund.org/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2012/Jul/State-Health-Insurance-Exchange-Laws/aspx. 
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such a change would require federal legislation, since by law, only a state 
Medicaid agency can determine eligibility for Medicaid.41 
But even if greater alignment were to happen, either through state 
computerized integration of the Medicaid/premium subsidy enrollment 
function or through a federal law permitting federally administered 
Exchanges to directly enroll Medicaid-eligible persons in Medicaid,42 the 
problem of income fluctuation as a result of a continual flow of life events 
means that the concept of measuring subsidy sources in relation to 
“coverage months” seems hopelessly inefficient. Informing government of 
changes in income, family size, and other matters that might affect eligibility 
will become an all-consuming event. Prior to the ACA, states had the 
flexibility to ignore minor income fluctuations43 (although virtually none did 
so); in the wake of passage, however, this flexibility is eliminated in favor of 
a unified MAGI test, which eliminates states’ power to disregard income 
fluctuations.44 
Where cash welfare is concerned, there might be some limited 
justification for such a month-to-month approach to government assistance. 
Where the goal is to stabilize health care, the process is absurd on its face. 
Far more desirable would be legislation to establish annual enrollment 
periods with an uninterrupted entitlement to a subsidy source throughout the 
enrollment period. Obviously during periods in which the subsidy is tax-
based, the federal government would absorb 100% of the costs, with states 
sharing the cost (after 2016 in the case of newly eligible persons and 
beginning in 2014 in the case of traditional eligibility groups, for whom the 
federal financial contribution remains at pre-ACA levels) in the case of 
Medicaid. Both the federal and state partners would want the other to bear 
as much cost exposure as possible. But life being what it is, over a several-
year time period, the economics of annual enrollment periods would 
essentially be a wash. 
2. Aligning Eligibility Policy for Persons with Disabilities 
Medicaid plays two basic roles as an insurer. The first is as a primary 
insurer for millions of children and adults who have no other source of 
coverage, either through the employer system or any other insuring 
 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (2011). 
 42. Whether a federal amendment commanding states to accept as eligible individuals 
determined eligible for Medicaid by a federal exchange could succeed politically is another 
matter. 
 43. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (2011) (requiring states to set reasonable 
standards for determining income); 42 C.F.R. § 435.916 (2012) (permitting states to establish 
annual eligibility periods). 
 44. ACA § 2002 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §1396a(e) (2011)). 
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mechanism. The second is as a supplemental insurer, both for Medicare 
beneficiaries45 as well as for individuals who may have other forms of 
coverage, such as employer-sponsored benefits and for whom their primary 
coverage is inadequate. Medicaid’s role as a secondary payer dates back to 
the program’s 1965 enactment.46 Indeed, the ACA strengthens Medicaid’s 
potential role as a secondary payer by requiring states, as a condition of 
participation, to finance premium assistance as a part of Medicaid 
coverage, thereby potentially expanding Medicaid’s role as a dual insurer.47 
In this respect, Medicaid’s role as a supplemental source of coverage 
predates the policy shift toward exclusivity of coverage under governmental 
insurance programs, a shift that occurred in response to concerns over the 
claimed potential of public payers to “crowd-out” the private market.48 
Medicaid’s role as a supplemental insurer for persons with disabilities 
remains central to the program’s role in the healthcare system, particularly 
in relation to the limitations of commercial insurance, whose design serves 
as the benchmark for the new subsidized Exchange market. Even though the 
ACA bars exclusion and discrimination on the basis of disability at the point 
of enrollment, the Act bakes discriminatory insurer practices into coverage 
design in several ways. The frame of reference for the essential health 
benefit (EHB) package49 that lies at the heart of Exchange plans is the 
“typical” employer market.50 Although the ACA bars the Secretary from 
introducing benefit designs in essential health benefits that discriminate on 
the basis of disability,51 she has, in fact, ceded her authority over benefit 
design to states, who determine the design of their essential health benefit 
packages from among their employer-sponsored group markets.52 
 
 45. Approximately 9.1 million Medicare beneficiaries also were enrolled in Medicaid in 
FY 2008 for either partial or full coverage. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, 
MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR DUAL ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES 1 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/upload/7846-03.pdf. 
 46. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(25) (2011); see also COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, MEDICAID 1 
(2003), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/greenbook2003/medi 
caid.pdf. 
 47. ACA § 2003 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396e-1 (2011)). 
 48. See Schlesinger, supra note 33, at 854, 860. 
 49. ACA § 1302 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2011)). 
 50. Id. § 1302(b)(2)(A). 
 51. Id. § 1302(b)(4)(B). For a discussion of the non-discrimination in benefit design 
provision, see Sara Rosenbaum et al., Crossing the Rubicon: The Impact of the Affordable 
Care Act on the Content of Insurance Coverage for Persons with Disabilities, 25 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 527, 555 (2011). 
 52. CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN 2, 8 
(2011), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/12162011/essential_health_ 
benefits_bulletin.pdf. 
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Other than extension of mental health parity to Exchange plans,53 as of 
spring 2013, there is no final federal policy on how states must broadly 
adjust benefit design to counter discrimination in coverage on the basis of 
disability.54 As a result, federal implementing standards do not override the 
limitations and exclusions commonly used to narrow coverage for persons 
with disabilities, such as medical necessity limitations that exclude coverage 
for which “normal” functioning cannot be restored, or exclusions that bar 
coverage for treatments considered “social” or “educational.”55 These types 
of limitations have no counterpart in Medicaid, which bars arbitrary 
limitations based on condition56 and which provides uncommonly broad 
coverage of children under 21 through the early and periodic screening 
diagnosis and treatment benefit (EPSDT).57As such, Medicaid is particularly 
effective in coverage of supplemental long-term services and supports such 
as the services of personal attendants, additional levels of prescription drug 
coverage beyond that found in a typical employer plan, and additional 
treatments and services for conditions that require ongoing interventions. In 
other words, through its expansive coverage and third party liability 
provisions, Medicaid is designed to work alongside other forms of coverage. 
This has been particularly important for working families with disabled 
children, as well as for disabled adults who return to work and who, under 
expanded Medicaid eligibility policies, are permitted to retain Medicaid even 
while they have primary coverage through an employer. 
However, rather than permitting Medicaid to play a supplemental role 
for persons with Exchange coverage, the ACA follows the exclusivity rule and 
introduces anti-crowd-out restrictions into the law by barring Exchange 
premium subsidies in any coverage month in which individuals are entitled 
to Medicaid coverage. This means that low and moderate income 
individuals and families entitled to Medicaid on the basis of disability are 
 
 53. ACA § 1311(j) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2011)). 
 54. Proposed regulations issued on November 26, 2012 and governing essential health 
benefits bar plan designs that discriminate on the basis of disability but offer no illustration of 
what such discrimination might look like. 77 Fed. Reg. 70644 (proposed Nov. 26, 2012) (to 
be codified at 45 C.F.R. §156.125). 
 55. See, e.g., SARA ROSENBAUM, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, O’ NEILL INST., INSURANCE 
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HEALTH STATUS 6-7 (2009), available at http://scholarship. 
law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=ois_papers (discussing types 
of exclusions which limit coverage for treatment); see also Mary Crossley, Discrimination 
Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 95 (2005) (discussing 
federal ADA interpretation which limits protection for persons with disabilities). 
 56. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (2012). 
 57. For a full discussion of the EPSDT benefit in relation to commercial insurance norms, 
see Sara Rosenbaum & Paul Wise, Crossing the Medicaid-Private Insurance Divide: The Case 
of EPSDT, 26 HEALTH AFF. 382 (2007). 
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ineligible to simultaneously receive premium subsidies for Exchange 
coverage. It also means that states are confronted with a basic choice: 
either continue higher Medicaid eligibility levels for children and adults with 
disabilities as permitted under law and forego the financial offsets that 
would accrue from their receipt of primary coverage through Exchanges; or 
eliminate more generous Medicaid eligibility standards for disabled children 
and adults in order to qualify them for fully federally funded Exchange 
subsidies. Furthermore, if, in response to the Medicaid expansion turmoil 
introduced into the picture by the Supreme Court’s Medicaid holding in 
NFIB, the Administration were to permit states to partially implement the 
Act’s Medicaid expansion provision — say, up to only 100% of the poverty 
line, which in turn triggers entitlement to Exchange premium subsidies under 
the ACA58 — the termination point for Medicaid eligibility for persons with 
disabilities could sink even lower. An HHS ruling issued on December 10, 
2012 in fact rejected a partial Medicaid expansion pathway as not 
authorized under the Act.59 It appears therefore, that the potential for a 
rollback of disability-based Medicaid eligibility is limited to beneficiaries with 
family incomes exceeding the Exchange eligibility threshold. 
One solution to this dilemma would require modification of both 
Medicaid and the ACA’s premium assistance and Exchange provisions to 
permit states to continue to furnish Medicaid based on disability to low and 
moderate income persons whose simultaneous entitlement to medical 
assistance otherwise would be barred by the Act’s anti-crowd-out provisions. 
In addition, amendments eliminating the anti-crowd-out provisions of the 
ACA in the case of disability would be paired with amendments that provide 
enhanced levels of federal funding to states that either retain or establish 
more generous Medicaid eligibility standards based on disability in order to 
supplement Exchange coverage. 
It is too soon to tell, of course, what states will do. But the betting is on a 
massive Medicaid eligibility rollback of enhanced coverage based on 
disability in order to qualify persons with incomes above the Exchange 
threshold (wherever it might ultimately be set) for premium subsidies. In its 
current form, the Act simply provides no incentive for states to maintain 
higher Medicaid eligibility levels for persons with disabilities, nor does it 
 
 58. See Sara Rosenbaum & Timothy Westmoreland, The Supreme Court’s Surprising 
Decision On The Medicaid Expansion: How Will The Federal Government And States 
Proceed?, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1663, 1668-69 (2012). 
 59. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON 
EXCHANGES, MARKET REFORMS, AND MEDICAID 12 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at 
http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/exchanges-faqs-12-10-2012.pdf; Sara Rosenbaum & 
Timothy Westmoreland, The Administration’s Decision on Partial Medicaid Implementation: 
True to the Law, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (December 19, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/ 
12/19/the-administrations-decision-on-partial-medicaid-implementation-true-to-the-law/. 
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even allow states to do so. Indeed, the incentives appear to move state 
Medicaid policy in precisely the opposite direction, while denying persons 
with disabilities in more generous Medicaid states the ability to secure 
primary coverage through a qualified health plan offered through their state 
Exchange, a fundamental disability-based distinction if there ever were one. 
3. Aligning Coverage Design 
As noted, the ACA utilizes the EHB coverage design model for Exchange 
products. The ACA also grafts the EHB design onto the Medicaid coverage 
standards in the case of the newly eligible adult population.60 Prior to the 
ACA’s passage, states already had been given the option under the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 200561 to move to a more commercially-oriented 
“benchmark” benefit design in the case of certain low income adult and 
child populations. But the benchmark option excluded, among other 
beneficiary populations, parents receiving Temporary Aid to Needy Families 
(TANF) benefits and those who would have to continue to meet their states’ 
1996 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) eligibility 
standards.62 Thus, where the adult population was concerned, the 2006 
benchmark option applied only to small groups of low income adults.63 
The ACA replaces the 2006 benchmark coverage standard with the 
more rigorous EHB coverage design.64 The ACA also preserves the state 
option to supplement commercial benchmark coverage with additional 
benefits, such as vision and dental care, that represent coverage options for 
adults.65 Finally, the ACA retains the earlier benchmark coverage provision 
that requires states to supplement benchmark coverage in the case of 
individuals under age 21 with full Medicaid coverage for all EPSDT 
benefits.66 
The ACA amendments create an anomalous situation. On the one 
hand, newly eligible low income adults receive EHB-level benchmark 
 
 60. ACA § 2001(c) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b) (2011)). 
 61. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6044, 120 Stat. 4, 88-92 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7 (2006)). 
 62. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(a)(2) (2011) (listing the excluded Medicaid beneficiary 
categories). 
 63. In effect, the only adults whose coverage could be subject to the benchmark standard 
would be certain narrow optional coverage groups such as 18-21 year olds who remained 
eligible for coverage under their state plan, optional pregnant women, and optional low 
income parents. 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b) (2011). 
 65. Id. § 1396u-7(a)(1)(C). 
 66. Id. § 1396u-7(a)(1)(A)(ii). For a discussion of the EPSDT benefit, which has a storied 
history and has been the subject of extensive litigation, see Rosenbaum & Wise, supra note 
57. 
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coverage, including comprehensive preventive services without cost sharing, 
a wide array of other coverage classes, and full mental health parity. On the 
other hand, the poorest adult populations (those eligible for TANF or poor 
enough to still qualify for cash assistance under their state’s 1996 AFDC 
program) receive traditional benefits that do not treat preventive care as a 
coverage requirement and that lack a mental health parity protection with 
the exception of beneficiaries enrolled in certain managed care 
arrangements.67 Arguably the EHB benefit design actually is superior to 
Medicaid’s traditional coverage design where low income adults are 
concerned, and yet the poorest adults are barred from receiving this level of 
coverage and remain consigned to Medicaid’s traditional coverage design. 
One solution would be to allow states to move all low income adults 
into the EHB benefit design. As previously discussed, such a move would 
result in certain limitations in coverage for low income adults that previously 
were barred under traditional Medicaid coverage rules, such as the 
prohibition against arbitrary discrimination on the basis of condition in the 
case of required services.68 This prohibition, as noted, historically has 
prevented states from adopting certain commercial insurance practices, 
such as excluding certain conditions from coverage or denying treatments to 
patients whose conditions require treatments to avert further loss of 
functioning rather than restore “normal function.” But, as also noted, this 
prohibition against arbitrary coverage rules is at least partially met through 
the mental health parity requirements that become applicable to EHB 
coverage arrangements under the ACA. Furthermore, because EHB design 
encompasses not only rehabilitative services but also those that are 
habilitative in nature, the EHB design limits the degree to which otherwise 
covered treatments can be excluded because they are prescribed in order to 
develop or maintain functioning rather than to restore the loss of prior 
function, a routine form of discrimination found in standard commercial 
plans. 
Allowing states to move to the EHB design also would eliminate 
coverage requirements for certain services directly tied to support of the 
healthcare safety net, in particular, Medicaid’s “federally qualified health 
center service” (FQHC) benefit,69 which treats the services of community 
health centers as an actual coverage category, not simply a locus of care. At 
 
 67. See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir. of Ctr. for Medicaid and State Operations, to State 
Health Officials 2 (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archived-
downloads/SMDL/downloads/SHO110409.pdf (providing an explanation of how mental 
health parity affects managed care arrangements). 
 68. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (regarding the interaction of Medicaid 
coverage standards and disability). 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(2)(C) (2011). 
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the same time, quite apart from the FQHC benefit mandate, federal 
Medicaid law also requires states to pay health centers at special enhanced 
rates for the covered benefits and services they furnish, thereby protecting 
them from a steep revenue loss for covered services. The FQHC payment 
rule, which is separate from the coverage rule, spans multiple healthcare 
delivery arrangements: qualified health plans sold in health insurance 
Exchanges;70 Medicaid managed care arrangements;71 health plans sold 
through the Children’s Health Insurance Program;72 and Medicaid’s basic 
fee-for-service system.73 Thus, even were the FQHC coverage requirement 
to be eliminated, Medicaid’s special payment standard for covered benefits 
would remain in place, as would Medicaid’s special payment rules for 
hospitals treating a disproportionate number of low income patients (DSH 
payments).74 
4. Aligning Coverage Products 
Federal Medicaid law provides for program administration, at state 
option, through managed care arrangements. Three-quarters of all 
 
 70. ACA § 10104 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2011)). 
 71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396u-7(b)(4), 1396u-2(h)(2)(C) (2011). 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 1397gg(e)(1)(G) (2011). 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb) (2011). 
 74. The fact that revising coverage rules under Medicaid would not alter safety net 
payment standards is only part of the story, however. The ACA imposes specific reductions on 
Medicare DSH hospital payments as well as states’ Medicaid DSH allocations, which are fixed 
and subject to annual global limits as a result of amendments enacted to Medicaid in 1991 
aimed at halting what was characterized as an abuse of the Medicaid DSH payment system. 
MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS COMM. (MACPAC), MARCH 2012 REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON MEDICAID AND CHIP 181 (2012), available at http://www.modernhealthcare. 
com/Assets/pdf/CH78650315.PDF. For a history of federal Medicaid DSH payment reforms, 
see id. at ch. 3. The ACA’s DSH payment reductions were criticized prior to NFIB because of 
their overly optimistic assumption about the extent to which the Act’s Medicaid eligibility 
expansions would reduce the need for supplemental funding for DSH hospitals; the ACA DSH 
amendments also were criticized for the degree to which the ACA continued to allow states 
latitude in how they target DSH payments. With the pace of the Medicaid expansion now 
thrown into uncertainty as a result of the Court’s decision, the potential adverse implications of 
the ACA’s DSH payment cuts looms larger. For an overview of the ACA DSH amendments, 
see The Estimated Effect of the Affordable Care Act on Medicare and Medicaid Outlays and 
Total National Health Care Expenditures: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of Richard Foster, FSA, Chief Actuary, Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs.), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2011/03/t201103 
30e.html. For a discussion of the potential implications of the ACA DSH reductions on safety 
net hospitals without concomitant amendments to strengthen DSH targeting rules, see NAT’L 
ASS. OF PUB. HOSP. & HEALTH SYS., EQUITABLE, SUSTAINABLE, RELIABLE SAFETY NET FINANCING: 
MEDICAID DSH 3-4 (2012), available at http://www.modernhealthcare.com/Assets/pdf/CH78 
650315.PDF. 
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beneficiaries receive coverage through compulsory managed care 
enrollment,75 akin to enrollment in a qualified health plan in a state 
Exchange. In both cases, the entities that sell these products (e.g., qualified 
health plans, Medicaid managed care products) must meet certain 
conditions of participation. The conditions vary, but not enormously. Indeed, 
the two sets of conditions of participation parallel one another across most 
areas, including marketing, access to care, network adequacy, grievance 
and appeals rights, access to emergency care, independent external review, 
and safety net payment requirements.76 
There are differences in requirements, however, the most notable being 
an insurance licensure requirement that applies only to qualified health 
plans.77 In addition, qualified health plans operating in state insurance 
exchanges must enter into agreements with certain “essential community 
providers.”78 No similarly comprehensive provider contracting provision 
applies to Medicaid managed care, but this is because, as a practical 
matter, Medicaid managed care networks already are dominated by 
“essential community providers” treating high volumes of low income 
patients.79 Another difference between the Medicaid managed care market 
and the market for qualified health plans through the Exchanges involves 
accreditation: qualified health plans must be accredited,80 whereas 
accreditation is not an express Medicaid managed care requirement. But 
even here, the differences are not insurmountable, as of 2010, 16 state 
 
 75. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID MANAGED CARE ENROLLMENT REPORT 
1 (2011), available at http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Top 
ics/Data-and-Systems/Downloads/2011-Medicaid-MC-Enrollment-Report.pdf. 
 76. Compare ACA § 1311 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2011)), and ACA § 1302 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2011)) (stating standards applicable to state Exchanges and 
qualified health plans), with 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2 (2010) (stating standards applicable to 
Medicaid managed care plans and states that elect to furnish coverage through managed 
care arrangements). For a comprehensive review of similarities and differences, see DEBORAH 
BACHRACH ET AL., CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: HOW STATES 
EXPERIENCE CAN INFORM EXCHANGE QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN STANDARDS (2011), available at 
http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/Medicaid_Managed_Care_and_QHP_Standards_final.pdf 
(paralleling the marketing, ease of access, safety net payments, emergency care, and 
grievance rights of qualified health plans and state Medicaid managed care). 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(C)(i) (2011). 
 78. ACA § 1311(c)(1)(C) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2011)). The term is defined to 
encompass all health care entities qualified to participate in a special prescription drug 
discount program authorized under the Public Health Service Act for providers furnishing a 
high volume of care to low income patients. 
 79. See BACHRACH ET AL., supra note 76, at 4. 
 80. ACA § 1311(c)(1)(D) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2011)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] MEDICAID’S NEXT FIFTY YEARS 345 
Medicaid programs required accreditation, and, as noted, external review is 
a feature of Medicaid managed care.81 
Because the conditions of participation applicable to qualified health 
plans and Medicaid managed care entities essentially cover the same policy 
ground, a logical step to encourage greater alignment would be to update 
the older Medicaid managed care standards (enacted in 1997) to reflect the 
ACA’s newer expectations. While extending a state licensure requirement to 
the Medicaid product market would be a major departure from prior 
practices, states do have the power to establish specific licensure standards 
for issuers of Medicaid managed care products. This would thus enable 
states to accommodate community-based entities that desire to operate in 
the Exchange premium subsidy market, but lack the reserves maintained by 
large issuers. The licensure requirement would likely foster corporate 
affiliations between these smaller community-based plans and the larger 
licensed issuers so as to permit the entry of the community-based entities 
into the large crossover member market as a means of maintaining 
continuity of care. 
Market alignment requires another step, namely addressing Medicaid’s 
historically low provider payment rates (particularly for physician services) as 
the cause of the dearth of healthcare providers willing to participate in the 
Medicaid provider network. Although the health reform legislation contains 
a temporary payment boost for Medicaid primary care services, the reform is 
only two years in duration.82 One solution might be to require plans 
operating in the crossover market to use Medicare payments as a floor. 
Such a requirement would have the effect of raising Medicaid provider 
payment rates while establishing a floor for Exchange provider payment 
levels. Another approach might be the creation of financial incentives in the 
form of more generous stop-loss levels for plans operating in the crossover 
market that boost physician payment levels. 
5. Aligning Federal Financing 
The ACA attempts to resolve the age-old problem of the federal 
government’s role in Medicaid financing with an approach that, charitably 
put, is limited. In essence, states receive a highly enhanced federal 
contribution toward the Medicaid costs associated with reform, but only for 
certain populations,83 who in truth (and contrary to Chief Justice Roberts’ 
 
 81. See BACHRACH ET AL., supra note 76, at 9. 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(C) (2011). 
 83. In broad terms, states will receive 100% federal funding over the 2014-2016 time 
period for medical assistance costs incurred for newly eligible populations (i.e., nonelderly 
adults ineligible for Medicare and not otherwise entitled to assistance because of their 
membership in one of the traditional coverage groups). Special rules apply to states that 
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characterization in NFIB84) can barely be distinguished in many cases from 
traditional populations. Indeed, a matter of a few dollars of monthly income 
would result in the movement of millions of parents from “traditional” to 
newly eligible categories. Coping with this situation will be extremely 
difficult, since it will require states to track the slightest income fluctuations 
of millions of low income adults, as daily work and family life change. The 
clear solution is a unified, enhanced federal contribution level covering all 
Medicaid populations who, depending on income, would qualify for 
premium subsidies through their state Exchanges. Regardless of whether 
attachment to Medicaid is based on low family income or disability, the 
group to target for enhanced federal payments is individuals who, based on 
income, will derive their coverage under either regime. This expanded 
approach to enhanced coverage (coupled with a new state option to allow 
Medicaid function as a secondary payer to Exchange coverage in the case 
of persons with disabilities) would blunt the potential for elimination of 
expanded Medicaid coverage for children and adults with disabilities while 
simplifying the accounting requirements for calculating federal payments to 
states. To be sure, this reform would require greater federal outlays on the 
Medicaid side. But to the extent that moving in this direction reduces states’ 
incentive to eliminate coverage of all optional eligibility groups whose 
incomes surpass the Exchange threshold, a greater federal contribution 
could be expected to be a wash over the long term, since the Congressional 
Budget Office estimates a 50% differential between Exchange and Medicaid 
per capita coverage.85 
III.  FUTURE REFORM PROSPECTS 
All legislative reform is evolutionary. The history of legislative health 
policy is no different — a seminal enactment followed by a succession of 
 
already had expanded eligibility for the newly eligible population using the Social Security 
Act’s special demonstration authority. See 42 U.S.C. §1315 (2011). Beginning in 2017, this 
enhanced funding will decline, ultimately remaining at 90% in 2020 and for years thereafter. 
ACA § 2001 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §1395d(y) (2011)). The normal federal contribution rate 
remains in place for traditional eligibility groups as well as for costs associated with plan 
administration. 
 84. See 132 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 85. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE OF THE AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT, UPDATED FOR THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT DECISION 1, 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEs 
timates.pdf (showing $9000 per capita in the Exchange and $6000 per capita in Medicaid). 
This difference is commonly attributable to Medicaid’s depressed provider payment rates in 
relation to the private insurance market. Id. at 16. Of course, the federal government also 
would lose the value of state contributions to the cost of Medicaid coverage for previously 
eligible persons whose coverage was eliminated. 
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amendments aimed at modifying and revising earlier policy decisions or 
strengthening initial policy choices. Indeed, the ACA itself represents a series 
of legislative modifications to a host of existing laws in an attempt to make 
them operate in a more harmonious fashion: the Internal Revenue Code; 
the Public Health Service Act; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act; 
Medicare; and Medicaid. In some cases the legislative foray under the ACA 
entails the addition of entirely new legislative authority to an underlying law, 
as in the creation of health insurance Exchanges. More frequently, however, 
the ACA alters existing provisions of law in order to promote alignment with 
evolving policy choices. 
Under normal circumstances, the types of reforms identified in this 
article would be considered part of the standard course of lawmaking. It 
took about 15 years of trying and at least four distinct sets of legislative 
amendments to create a universal Medicaid entitlement for low-income 
children and pregnant women, to strengthen their coverage, and to 
streamline and simplify the enrollment process for these populations. It is 
hardly surprising therefore, that the newest generation of Medicaid reforms 
will require further refinement. Medicaid is a vast program, with total 
expenditures surpassing $400 billion in FY 2010 and a projected 
enrollment approaching 80 million people by 2020.86 It is one of the most 
complex laws ever enacted by Congress; indeed, no less a judge than Henry 
Friendly famously termed its provisions “almost unintelligible to the 
uninitiated.”87 The need for further amendment and refinement thus should 
hardly come as a surprise. 
But, of course, this is no ordinary time for Medicaid. The fury over 
Medicaid has never been higher, fueled by costs, ideology, and an 
unprecedented level of political animus. Medicaid’s very legislative structure 
— national policy goals achieved through federal investments that build on 
and strengthen state efforts to aid the medically indigent and vulnerable — 
has been thrown into uncertainty by NFIB v. Sebelius, whose undefined 
reach into the future of federal spending programs is the subject of intense 
scholarship.88 Despite public opinion polls underscoring its popularity with 
 
 86. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, 2010 ACTUARIAL 
REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OUTLOOK FOR MEDICAID iii-iv (2010), available at http://www.cms. 
gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/ActuarialStudies/down 
loads/MedicaidReport2010.pdf. 
 87. And this was more than 35 years ago, when the program was far simpler. See 
Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 88. See Huberfield, supra note 3 (discussing challenges in the future of Medicaid created 
by the NFIB decision); see also Bagenstos, supra note 3 (describing the uncertainties brought 
by interpretations of this case’s decision). 
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the American public,89 Medicaid remains exceptionally vulnerable to attack 
in what is anticipated to be a seminal battle over its future and that of other 
social welfare entitlements in the wake of the 2012 Presidential election. 
Following the watershed election in November, three possible scenarios 
await Medicaid in the 113th Congress. The first — highly unlikely — is to 
make only minor structural modifications in the program while attempting to 
reduce spending in the $100 billion to $200 billion range (modest in a 
program projected to spend trillions in federal funds alone over the coming 
decade) by simply cutting federal funding to states. This is the action 
Congress took as a part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, 
essentially applying a three percent discount to the payments they otherwise 
owed state programs.90 In 1984, the 1981 payment reductions were 
eliminated and federal funding was restored (indeed, in periods of 
recession, federal Medicaid funding has been increased).91 States were 
given certain added flexibility measures as part of the 1981 reductions, but 
not such expansive powers that the basic framework of the entitlement to 
coverage was structurally up-ended. 
The two alternatives to the aforementioned minor surgery are far more 
invasive. The first is a proposal to “block grant” Medicaid. The second is a 
proposal to fundamentally alter Medicaid’s open-ended financing structure 
through the use of per capita caps. In both cases, it is likely that the 
“baseline” used to estimate the size of the reductions and the impact of the 
savings will be Medicaid as restructured under the ACA. In other words, the 
starting point will be a program that assumes elimination of Medicaid’s 
historic barrier against federal funding to cover all low income people. 
Whichever pathway Congress chooses however, states would be expected to 
achieve the Medicaid reform goals with dramatically less federal financing. 
Were Congress to choose what is popularly termed a “block grant”92 
pathway, federal expenditures per state would be subject to annual 
 
 89. See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL: MAY 2011 PUBLIC 
OPINION ON HEALTH CARE ISSUES 1 (2011) (finding 60% public support for preserving Medicaid 
as an entitlement program and only 13% support for major reductions). These figures are not 
significantly different from public opinion regarding Medicare reforms. 
 90. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1981, at 10 
(Comm. Print 1981). 
 91. See, e.g., American Adjustment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115, 116, 489-90 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2010)) (discussing incentives for 
Medicaid in an act to stimulate economic recovery). 
 92. Actually the term is probably not right. In a block grant, federal payments are made in 
advance of state expenditures, with limited state accountability for results. My own betting is 
that federal Medicaid spending would remain an after-the-fact event, with continuing tight 
federal controls over what is considered a qualifying state expenditure. This type of tight 
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aggregate caps, with concomitant evisceration of federal legal requirements 
in order to give states broad leeway in how they absorb the loss of funds. 
The enormity of the funding loss, as well as the difficulties of apportionment 
given the differences in states’ fiscal starting points under a block grant, 
both have led to the repeated abandonment of the proposal.93 
The latest version of this repeatedly discredited idea shows up in a 2012 
proposal issued by the United States House of Representatives Budget 
Committee contained in The Path to Prosperity: A Blueprint for American 
Renewal.94 The proposal, virtually identical to one put forward in 2011, 
proposes to repeal the ACA Medicaid expansions and to block grant the 
remaining program, with growth indexed to inflation and population growth. 
The Committee asserts that this approach would restore state flexibility and 
autonomy while improving provider payments and consumer choice. The 
proposal offers no insight as to how states and the federal government will 
cope with the changes in eligibility, enrollment, benefits and coverage, 
consumer protections, and administration requirements that the Committee 
favors. The Committee estimates that the block grant proposal will reduce 
federal Medicaid outlays by $810 billion over the FY 2013-2023 time 
period, not counting the nearly $1 trillion in savings achieved by repealing 
the ACA Medicaid expansion.95 
Analysis suggests that the projected $810 billion in losses resulting from 
placing arbitrary limits on federal Medicaid spending through a block grant 
would be the least level of impact that states could anticipate.96 Were state 
Medicaid costs to rise faster than the proposed growth factor, the level of 
true loss relative to Medicaid’s historic open-ended financing system would 
be far greater. The losses — which project to about 22% over the 2012-
 
control is not unexpected in a very large program and is the method used in the case of 
Section 1115 demonstrations that award states flexibility. 
 93. See Jeanne M. Lambrew, Making Medicaid a Block Grant Program: An Analysis of the 
Implications of Past Proposals, 83 MILBANK QUARTERLY 41, 46 (2005) (examining the potential 
impact had block grant legislation passed by Congress but vetoed by President Clinton 
succeeded). The author estimated as much as a 25% decline in federal Medicaid funding, 
with highly differential impacts among the states given differences in underlying economic 
conditions, health care cost factors, and other considerations. Id. at 51-52, 54. 
 94. PAUL RYAN, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BUDGET COMM., THE PATH TO PROSPERITY: A 
BLUEPRINT FOR AMERICAN RENEWAL 14 (2012), available at http://budget.house.gov/uploaded 
files/pathtoprosperity2013.pdf. 
 95. Id. at 42; see also Report: GOP proposals would cut $1.7T from Medicaid, THE 
ADVISORY BOARD COMPANY (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.advisory.com/Daily-Briefing/2012/ 
10/24/GOP-proposals-would-cut-1-7-T-from-Medicaid. 
 96. EDWIN PARK & MATT BROADDUS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, WHAT IF 
CHAIRMAN RYAN’S MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT HAD TAKEN EFFECT IN 2001?: FEDERAL MEDICAID 
FUNDS WOULD HAVE FALLEN BY 35% OR MORE IN MOST STATES, BY HALF IN SOME, BY 2010, at 1 
(2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-20-12health.pdf. 
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2022 time period and a 34% reduction in 2022 alone97 — would mask 
much steeper proportional losses in certain states. The state programs that 
risk the greatest relative losses are those that stand to gain the most 
proportionately from the ACA expansions. The impact of the loss would be 
greatest because these states, such as Texas, Florida, and other southern 
and southwestern states have high uninsured populations and thus stand to 
gain the most from coverage expansion.98 A prominent analysis released in 
the fall of 2012 determined that under a plan that both repeals the 
Medicaid expansion and block grants the program, enrollment would fall by 
about 35 million persons by 2022.99 Furthermore, since the federal 
government would presumably continue to make Medicaid payments only in 
connection with approved state expenditures, the pattern of federal 
disallowances and recoveries and constant state disputes that characterizes 
the program today100 would be expected to persist. In other words, block 
grant funds would not be free money. Indeed, if a 2012 congressional flap 
over whether HHS has the legal authority to permit states to modify the rigid 
work requirements of the TANF block grant program is any guide,101 tough 
federal spending rules, coupled with ongoing and aggressive federal audit 
practices will remain core features of any successor program. It is fair to say 
that the desire of federal lawmakers to constrain federal financial support for 
state programs applies regardless of whether the mechanism for a funds 
transfer is open-ended or subject to limits. Indeed, were legislation limiting 
 
 97. Id. at 3. 
 98. See JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOUSE REPUBLICAN BUDGET PLAN: 
STATE-BY-STATE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN MEDICAID FINANCING 7 (2011). For example, Florida’s 
ten-year loss reached nearly 44% of what it would have received, while Vermont, a more 
generous state, would experience a 26% loss below expected levels. Id. at 6 fig.3. 
 99. SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH CARE IN THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION: HOW THE OBAMA AND ROMNEY PLANS STACK UP 28, at Ex. 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2012/Oct/
1636_Collins_hlt_care_2012_presidential_election_FINAL_CPI_revised_10_02_2012.pdf. 
 100. States have extensive appeals rights under Medicaid in furtherance of their entitlement 
interest in payment. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.42 (2012) (setting forth the procedural requirements 
for review of federal payment disallowances). 
 101. See Letter from Lynn H. Gibson, General Counsel, Gov’t Accountability Office, to 
Sen. Orrin Hatch, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on Finance, and Sen. Dave Camp, 
Chairman, House of Representatives Comm. on Ways and Means 6 (Sept. 4, 2012), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647778.pdf (regarding Congressional power to review the 
Secretary’s decision to permit waivers of the TANF work requirements by states that seek to 
establish an alternative approach to the terms of the statute). For a sense of the detailed 
federal oversight procedures used to govern state and tribal TANF spending, see DEP’T HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., TRIBAL TANF AND CCDF GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GRANTS 
ADMINISTRATION, AND PROGRAM ACCOUNTABILITY 13-15 (2004), available at http://www.acf. 
hhs.gov/sites/default/files/occ/fmgapa.pdf (explaining the types of federal payment 
disallowances that can be applied to governmental TANF recipients). 
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federal funding also to include provisions altering state performance 
requirements in the areas of eligibility, coverage, payment, and 
management (and presumably this will be the case), federal oversight could 
become more aggressive given the potential for looser standards to result in 
less rigorous state spending management and oversight. Put another way, a 
race to the bottom does not make the green eyeshades irrelevant. 
Furthermore, Medicaid is heavily embedded in state economies as a 
result of the complex financing arrangements on which the program rests (a 
combination of general revenues, special taxes, and transfers among units 
of governments that share responsibility for the operation of public 
healthcare systems serving Medicaid beneficiaries along with other low 
income populations).102 As a result, a block grant promises to set in motion 
a great economic unraveling as the losses spread through local public 
health economies, rolling over public healthcare institutions, school health 
systems, public health clinics, and public, community-based programs for 
persons with disabilities. This, of course, is where the strong public response 
to Medicaid is so telling: for millions of families, Medicaid is an essential 
part of the fabric of daily life. 
In view of the enormous consequences flowing from a block grant, the 
more plausible option, and one being discussed with increasing intensity, is 
what is known as a “per capita cap.” Under this approach, the federal 
government would cease to contribute a share of a state’s total program 
spending.103 Instead, the federal contribution would look more like a 
defined per capita contribution up to a fixed dollar amount per beneficiary 
served. While this approach does not so dramatically leave states strapped 
of resources to provide care for the tens of millions of low income Medicaid 
beneficiaries and to support the providers that serve those beneficiaries, it 
nonetheless raises numerous problems of its own. 
The first is the difficulty of fashioning a defined contribution 
methodology that properly accounts for health risks given states’ limited 
coverage experience with low income adults who are not parents of minor 
children. Many newly eligible persons will be healthy adults, but others will 
have extensive physical and mental health problems. The lack of cost 
experience, coupled with the general confusion regarding how to absorb the 
losses associated with a per capita cap, can be expected to dampen most 
states’ interest in Medicaid expansion, even if expansion with federal funding 
remains an option. 
 
 102. For a review of federal/state financial relationships and their effect on local health 
economies, see MACPAC, supra note 74, ch. 3. 
 103. EDWIN PARK & MATT BROADDUS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, MEDICAID PER 
CAPITA CAP WOULD SHIFT COSTS TO STATES AND PLACE LOW INCOME BENEFICIARIES AT RISK 1 
(2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-4-12health.pdf. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
352 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 6:329 
A second problem with a defined contribution model is the weakness of 
the methodology in relation to the actual cost of care. A pandemic, an 
unanticipated public health crisis such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic that swept 
the nation in the 1980s, a major natural or manmade disaster such as 
Hurricane Katrina or the World Trade Center attack, all can throw off 
actuarial projections that reflect normal conditions, as can major technology 
breakthroughs that create game-changing conditions for the healthcare 
system (for example, national spending on prescription drugs grew by 15% 
in 1998 alone).104 However, policymakers could fortify the defined 
contribution model with proper provisions to account for such anomalies. 
A third problem is that a per capita cap essentially takes a snapshot of 
state Medicaid spending as it exists at a specified moment in time (i.e., the 
baseline). Thus, states that have low per capita spending, either because of 
low pricing, limited coverage, or both, are in essence locked into artificially 
depressed caps. States that did not previously cover certain disabled 
populations but desire to add coverage would have no financial history 
against which the cap could be measured and so would be exposed to 
whatever unsupported methodology is proposed. States that experience 
large annual leaps in per beneficiary costs would have no means of 
recouping their losses, since the cap would be set to grow at a fixed rate 
(e.g., inflation plus one percent). And of course, quite problematically, once 
set, the cap could be lowered in the face of budgetary or other constraints. 
Moreover, in exchange for absorbing the impact of a per capita cap, states 
would demand far more flexibility in Medicaid than they now enjoy: over 
eligibility, enrollment, coverage, benefits, payments, and management 
requirements and safeguards. 
The final problem is the reality of Medicaid spending. The great driver of 
Medicaid spending today is enrollment. Pricing, which is quite depressed, 
and per capita costs, which are state-controlled through outlays and 
utilization, particularly in the case of costly populations, do not factor in as 
much. Indeed, so tightly managed are Medicaid expenditures that per 
enrollee growth rates for the coming decade are expected to be at GDP.105 
Viewed through this lens, it becomes evident that a per capita cap 
essentially saves nothing unless it is held below even the rate of GDP 
growth. Thus, while it certainly would be possible to embed a number of the 
reforms outlined in this article into a per capita cap approach to federal 
Medicaid spending, it is also true that states’ interest in improving its 
performance might be distinctly dampened by their need to contain costs 
below even minimal rates of inflation. 
 
 104. Id. at 6. 
 105. John Holahan & Stacey Morrow, Medicare and Medicaid Spending Trends and the 
Deficit Debate, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 393, 394 (2012). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The ACA made seminal Medicaid reforms while triggering a need for 
further alignment. As the Act has moved toward implementation, the need 
for additional reform has become clearer, an inevitability in any remarkably 
complex piece of legislation. Whether Medicaid’s next 50 years will witness 
its ongoing transformation, through continued federal investment, into an 
effective component of a comprehensive scheme of universal coverage or 
instead, its decline ultimately will be an intensely political determination 
rather than one driven by health policy. The policy argument pleads for 
continued strengthening; but the enduringly ferocious politics of Medicaid 
may be moving the program along a far different pathway. 
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